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Abstract 
 
 
Purpose – Why and how do cognitive distortions in managerial decision making occur? All 
organizations are imperfect systems (Katz and Khan, 1966), with wrong decisions often just 
round the corner. As a consequence, addressing these important questions continues to be 
particularly lively in the management development area, especially in terms of its intended 
contribution to the de-biasing activity. Thus, through this critical review article we aim to 
provide the current scientific dialogue on the topic with updated lenses, which can also be 
innovative from some aspects. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Our review framework is based on the recent, impactful 
article on biases in managerial decision making by Kahneman et al. (2011), and on Bazerman 
and Moore’s (2013) perspective on emanating heuristics, considered as the causes of biases. 
Accordingly, we derive four intertwined thematic clusters of heuristics, through which we 
systematically group and critically analyze the management literature mostly published on the 
topic since 2011.  
 
Findings – From the analyzed clusters we propose an integrative framework of emanating 
heuristics, which focuses on the co-evolving relationships and potentially self-reinforcing 
processes in and between them.  
 
Originality/value – The value of our contribution is threefold: 1) from a methodological 
perspective, to our knowledge, the studies adopted as the basis of our analysis have not yet 
been simultaneously used as a comprehensive ground for updated reviews on this topic; 2) 
from a conceptual perspective, the emerging integrative co-evolutionary framework can help 
explain the dangerous connections among cognitive traps and emanating heuristics; 3) from a 
practical perspective, our resulting framework can also be helpful for future de-biasing 
attempts in the business arena.  
 
 
Keywords: Cognition; Decision Making; Heuristics; Literature; Management Development; 
Co-evolution. 
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Reviewing Cognitive Distortions in Managerial Decision Making.  
Towards an Integrative Co-Evolutionary Framework 
 
1. Introduction 
Why and how do cognitive distortions in managerial decision making occur? Addressing 
these important questions continues to merit pivotal attention in both the literature on and 
practice of management development, particularly for its potential contribution to de-biasing 
techniques, which are constantly growing thanks to the continuous scientific dialogue 
between business experts and psychologists globally.  
The reason why the questions above remain lively to date is classical, apparently simple, 
yet still meaningful: all organizations are managed by human beings, and wrong decisions, by 
individuals or groups, are often just round the corner (Katz and Kahn, 1966). Some experts 
maintain that companies may drastically improve their performance by shifting to diligence-
based decision making (Powell, 2017). Rather than focusing on the expansion of analytics, 
decision makers should use existing datasets and avoid several cognitive distortions (Sibony 
et al., 2017).  
Over time, scholars have extensively questioned the assumption that individuals function 
as rational decision makers. The bounded rationality concept (Simon, 1947) seminally 
proposes the most prominent explanation for the fallacy of the fully rational model of decision 
making, based on three main factors limiting our rationality. First, individuals cannot have 
complete information needed for discounting the consequences following each decision. 
Second, individuals can only imperfectly anticipate the future occurrence of these 
consequences, because their imagination substitutes experiential knowledge for attributed 
values. Third, individuals lack knowledge about all the possible decisional alternatives in any 
given moment, which is necessary to make rational decisions. In sum, because the cognitive 
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information processing capacity is physiologically limited, cognitive distortions are far from 
being remote scenarios. 
Understanding why and how cognitive distortions often affect managerial decision making 
still remains unaddressed from many angles; thus, we have developed this critical review to 
provide the current scientific dialogue on the topic with updated lenses, which can also be 
innovative from some aspects. In this regard, the remainder of our article is as follows: by 
drawing on the research design of recent reviews published in the Journal of Management 
Development (Yahaya and Ebrahim, 2016), we first explain the motivation behind our work 
and the choice of our research framework; in this case, the framework is based on the recent 
article on biases in managerial decision making published by Kahneman et al. (2011), and on 
Bazerman and Moore’s (2013) perspective on emanating heuristics, considered as the causes 
of biases. Although these studies have been breakthroughs and impactful both for scholars 
and practitioners in the field, to our knowledge they have not yet been simultaneously used as 
a comprehensive basis for an updated review on this topic. In particular, thanks to the 
contemporaneous use of these studies, we derive four intertwined thematic clusters of 
emanating heuristics, through which we systematically group and critically analyze the 
management literature mostly published on the topic since 2011. Discussions and implications 
for management development follow.  
The main value of our article, we believe, is that from the analyzed clusters we propose an 
integrative framework of co-evolving and potentially self-reinforcing emanating heuristics – a 
framework from which, we also believe, the future de-biasing activity in the practice of 
business could benefit. In fact, on the one hand, the framework can help recognize the inner 
cognitive distortions at the basis of the (more explicit) emanating heuristics; on the other 
hand, it can help study cognitive distortions more holistically, through exploiting the most 
vivid linking pins between the biases and heuristics themselves. 
 4 
 
2. Motivation and framework of the review 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the term heuristics as “involving or serving as an aid 
to learning, discovery, or problem-solving by experimental and especially trial-and-error 
methods”. The term derives from the Greek heuretikos, which means “serving to discover or 
find out”. Newell and Simon (1972) seminally conceive heuristics as those cognitive shortcuts 
which our brain tends to use when its decision making process is limited, in terms of time and 
data availability. Thus, heuristics are self-learning strategies used to solve problems by 
searching and evaluating alternatives which we cannot handle through logic and probability 
theory. In fact, exhaustive searching is often impractical and we use heuristic methods to 
speed up the process of finding satisfactory solutions. In sum, we tend to make what is 
commonly referred to as an educated guess. 
Stemming from bounded rationality, subsequent studies attempt to answer Simon’s main 
theoretical question of how humans reason when the conditions for rationality supposed by 
neoclassical economics are not met (Cristofaro, 2017a). This question leads to two main 
schools of thought: Tversky and Kahneman’s heuristics-and-biases programme (1974), and 
Gigerenzer and Selten’s adaptive toolbox (2002). In 2003, Kahneman writes that he and 
Tversky have explored “a territory Simon had defined and named — the psychology of 
bounded rationality” (p. 697). In contrast, Gigerenzer and Selten claim that, for bounded 
rationality, Simon does not mean irrationality as, according to them, in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s heuristics-and-biases programme, but, instead, models that adopt a fast-and-
frugal rule for search. 
Uncertainty is a defining characteristic of human decision making. In real situations, 
human decision making has to fit with the individual’s bounded rationality and the 
environmental setting. Thus, the decision maker does not know all the possible options, with 
their consequences and probabilities. In Hilbert’s words, “our mind is the result of biological 
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evolution, which does not strive for perfection or even theoretical optimization, but simply for 
a competitive degree of fitness in a specific environment” (2012).  
The main question then becomes to understand when heuristics are useful and when they 
are harmful. In particular, we need to understand how to make heuristics more accurate, how 
to choose the most suitable heuristic, given our environment, and how to use them and cope 
with errors potentially arising. For example, the bounded awareness heuristic affects the 
information selection process; to avoid information overload, people often filter information 
unconsciously and automatically. This could lead to ignoring or neglecting useful, observable, 
and relevant data. Bounded awareness mainly derives from our tendency to over-focus. 
Focusing limits our awareness, with important information outside the range of our focus 
potentially disregarded. This is why texting and driving at the same time is highly dangerous; 
by focusing on the mobile phone, we overlook the presence of other cars.  
In sum, heuristics can often lead to systematic biases (Hammond et al., 1998). Biased 
judgment and decision making is the human tendency to make systematic errors based on 
cognitive factors rather than evidence. When choosing between alternatives, people make 
predictably irrational choices, often resulting in the same types of deviation that rational 
models predict. According to Bazerman and Moore (2013), common biases can be associated 
with and categorized within their emanating heuristic. 
Why are biases so important? As Kahneman (2011) explains, the irrational manner in 
which the human brain often works influences people’s decisions in ways that they and others 
around them fail to anticipate. The errors resulting from a biased process prevent us from 
making sound decisions. Moreover, even when we have gathered abundant work experience 
and knowledge, we are still subject to those biases and, in certain cases, even more subjected 
than inexperienced people.  
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Over time, management scholars have attempted to support the recurring belief that while 
heuristics may influence business decisions either in peius or in melius (e.g., Azas, 2014; 
Artinger et al., 2015), cognitive biases always have a negative effect on business choices 
(e.g., Abatecola and Uli, 2016; Cristofaro, 2017b; Mazutis and Eckardt, 2017). To reduce 
biases, both scholars and practitioners have tried to develop techniques and methods, which, 
to date, cover an ample spectrum of fields and whose nature and purpose are heterogeneous 
(Cristofaro, 2017c). For example, based on qualitative and quantitative approaches, these 
techniques have recently included management styles (Adizes, 2004), pre-mortem (Klein, 
2007), considering the opposite (Graf et al., 2012), third-party direct intervention (Caputo, 
2016), cognitive diversity (Meissner and Wulf, 2017) and Mindspace (Liu et al., 2017).  
On this premise, the most promising de-biasing technique currently seems to be the cross-
disciplinary checklist recently published by Kahneman et al. (2011) in their Big Idea article. 
According to this technique, a third person is needed in order to recognize and moderate the 
potential effects of distortions in the business decision making processes, through questioning 
decision makers with a set of 12 questions (each one linked to a precise trap, that can cover 
self-thinking processes, recommenders’ thinking processes, or features of the proposal under 
assessment). These links simplify the role of the third party, who has the duty of identifying 
the distortions and attempting to minimize their effects. This method has its theoretical pillars 
in the existence of System 1 and System 2 in our mind. In this regard, according to Kahneman 
(2003), the human cognitive functioning occurs in two different “Systems” of the human 
brain. System 1 is where the intuitive and unconscious thinking lies, while System 2 is where 
the thought is far more reflective and where individuals recognize the mistakes that occurred 
during reasoning. The operations of System 1 are fast and automatic, usually also emotionally 
driven; thus, they are difficult to control or modify. Conversely, the cognitive operations of 
System 2 are “more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled” 
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(Kahneman, 2003, p. 698). Kahneman (2003) also underlines that the output of System 1 is 
unmonitored by System 2. On this basis, the presence of a third party is pivotal for controlling 
the quality of decisions, because this allows the third party to identify the distortions 
occurring in the decision maker’s System 1.  
We have, therefore, decided to use Kahneman et al.’s (2011) recent framework as the 
comprehensive basis for our review for two main reasons: 1) from the beginning, this 
framework has not only been widely considered as innovative in the managerial decision 
making field, but also reliable and prospectively impactful, especially in its strong cross-
disciplinary implications for management development; 2) to our knowledge, the framework 
has not been used as a specific way for systematically grouping and subsequently analyzing 
the most recent literature on the topic (see Table 1).  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
As Table 1 reports, column 1 shows the 12 questions contained in the checklist created by 
Kahneman et al. (2011); in this regard, we have replicated the same initial classification 
because not only does it focus on content when executives review and challenge 
recommendations, but it pushes towards the sequential review of the recommendation process 
itself, in order to “retrace (executives’) steps to determine where intuitive thinking may have 
steered them off-track” (Kahneman et al., 2011, p. 53). Accordingly, columns 2 and 3 draw 
on Bazerman and Moore’s (2013) classification, and subsequent developments (e.g., Caputo, 
2013), to show the cognitive traps and “emanating” heuristics associated with the questions. 
In fact, according to Bazerman and Moore (2013, p. 37), cognitive traps are the effect of, or 
can be easily reconnected to, few heuristic mental mechanisms; the latter, in practice, 
influence our recollections and predictions, which, in turn, negatively and unconsciously 
 8 
 
affect our own mental processes (i.e., leading to cognitive traps). In this regard, column 3 
assumes a key role in our review. Consistently with the research design of recent review 
articles (e.g., Yahaya and Ebrahim, 2016), we have used the framework provided by the 
emanating heuristics to categorize articles around four thematic clusters: affect, 
availability/representativeness, confirmation, risk aversion. We have then reviewed the most 
representative studies (Table 1/column 4) published on the topic, with a particular focus on 
articles published after Kahneman and colleagues’ article in 2011. 
 
3. Affect 
Judgments are usually evoked by an affective evaluation happening even before any higher-
level reasoning occurs. This conceptualization is seminally studied by Zajonc (1980), who 
provides evidence that individuals’ affective states may: i) separately (from cognition) act on 
the information processing mechanism, ii) influence and be influenced by cognition, and iii) 
be the first response when the situation calls for rapidity in making decisions. Stemming from 
this last point, Finucane et al. (2000) interpret this mechanism as a heuristic; in practice, 
emotions substitute logical reasoning when decision makers have to rapidly assess the risks 
and benefits of a choice situation to improve the judgmental efficiency. The importance of 
this heuristic is subsequently highlighted by Dreman (2004), who retrospectively interprets 
the “dotcom bubble” in the early 2000s as being the outcome of investors’ affect heuristic. 
Indeed, according to him, the low level of scrutiny of highly risky stocks in bubbles is 
determined by the emotional link of investors with new start-ups’ dreams, which, however, 
have offered much lower returns than S&P 500 companies in the last two decades (81% vs. 
751% respectively). 
Due to this recognized importance, in recent years scholars have explored the affect 
mechanism under the lens of the different affective states that can influence managerial 
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decisions. For example, investigating the decision making of film directors, Coget et al. 
(2011) find that moderate intensity fear allows rational decision-making, while high intensity 
spreads more intuitive decision making. It therefore seems that affective states are connected 
with the search strategy of individuals, particularly with their tendency to collect confirming 
or divergent information. For example, Elsbach and Barr (1999) find that individuals 
experiencing a moderately negative mood are significantly more likely than those in a 
moderate positive mood to accurately follow all the steps of a structured decision protocol in 
its correct order. In other words, people with moderate-high levels of positive affect are more 
inclined to deviate from the beaten path and, as a consequence, to collect non-related 
information. Welpe et al. (2012) find that the exploitation of strategic decisions is reduced if 
decision makers experience fear, while the amount of strategic alternatives increases if they 
are in a joyful or angry mood. In contrast, Bachkirov (2015) finds that happiness and anger 
cause the decision maker to process less decision-relevant information. 
All this stated, Pachur and Galesic (2013) show that not only can the overload of 
information lead to choosing alternatives to which there is an affective link, but also that poor 
logic ability and cross-cultural differences play a pivotal role. Indeed, they find that the affect 
heuristic is usually implemented by less numerate decision makers (American people in their 
study), while more numerate decision makers (Germans) usually follow a minimax strategy. 
This result is later confirmed by Sokolowska and Sledoba (2015), who find that, during 
important strategic choices, decision makers who are experts in the object of the investment 
can avoid superficial evaluations because of their knowledge; however, in investment 
evaluations that evoke strong feelings, because of the decision makers’ involvement or social 
controversies regarding the object of assessment, risks and benefits are negatively correlated.  
However, despite these different developments, risk aversion still remains the most 
investigated driver of the affect heuristic; indeed, Schlösser et al. (2013) clearly demonstrate 
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that both anticipated and immediate emotions of the decision makers drive risky decisions. In 
particular, decision makers are concurrently influenced either by the emotions elicited by the 
subjective assessment of the perceived risky decision, or by the affective states emerging 
while contemplating the various options; however, the latter have a more significant effect in 
selecting alternatives. In practice, executives make decisions according to how they feel about 
the “riskless” portion of the decision, rather than according to their forecasted outcomes. 
Nonetheless, this relationship is twofold; as previously hypothesized and proved, affective 
states can, differently, amplify or reduce the perception of risk according to their prevalence 
and magnitude. 
Moreover, according to the experimental results of Townsend et al. (2014), the affect 
heuristic seems to interact in a deliberative way – rather than implicitly – with the perception 
of risk. Decision makers, in practice, explicitly assess the risk of decisions according to their 
cognitive resources and capacity (when they have them), otherwise they implicitly assess risk 
according to their affective states. However, the degree of perceived risk differently drives the 
use of deliberative or implicit assessment; the explicit use of affect is activated when the 
perceived risk is high, while the implicit mechanism works when this risk is low. 
 
4. Availability and representativeness 
The availability heuristic exists when people assess the probability of a future event on the 
basis of what past occurrences of that event are readily available in memory, which is not 
always correct (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Availability also applies to recent events. 
Indeed, this time effect appears because we tend to recall recent events more easily and 
therefore assume that they are more likely to happen. Relatedly, the representativeness 
heuristic exists when, in making a judgment about an individual, object, or event, people tend 
to look for traits corresponding to previously formed stereotypes (Kahneman and Tversky, 
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1974). Thus, we judge a few elements and automatically classify them into that category and, 
although this heuristic can be helpful in saving energy and time, stereotypes are just round the 
corner.  
On this premise, Mitchell and Shepherd’s (2011) study of the psychological underpinnings 
behind erratic strategic decisions finds important supportive results to the understanding of 
executives’ cognitive functions in strategic decision making. In particular, through the 
investigation of 2,048 decisions made by 64 CEOs of medium sized technology firms, these 
scholars look at the interplay between the metacognitive experience of executives (i.e., a 
person’s conscious experiences that are cognitive and affective in nature) and the 
dynamism/hostility of the environment. In the strategic choices analyzed, regarding 
executives’ willingness to invest in an opportunity, executives with great metacognitive 
experience make fewer erratic strategic decisions, but these results change according to their 
perception of the environment; in fact, executives perform more erratic decision making when 
they perceive the environment as hostile rather than dynamic – i.e., when they are able to 
associate the ongoing situation with one they are familiar with. 
However, in an environment that lacks fixed patterns, such as financial markets, where, 
every day, a small new piece of microeconomic or macroeconomic news can bring high 
upturn or downturn, decision makers’ cognition is affected both by their limited information 
and time pressure to make a decision about whether or not to abandon their positions 
(Bachkirov, 2015). In this case, following the available actions of the most renowned 
investors – represented as “winners” in decision makers’ minds – is the most applied heuristic 
in order not to look over their own shoulders. In this regard, Pentland (2013) explains how 
this intertwined heuristic improves traders’ social learning and financial performance. In 
particular, he shows that, among the different behavioural patterns, traders choosing to copy 
the available strategy of people regarded as successful, reach greater rewards. 
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Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) also provide proof that managers develop and use the 
availability and representativeness heuristics in strategic situations. In particular, they contend 
that firms learn and apply these heuristics in strategic contexts when time is short, information 
is limited, and the situation is novel. For example, one of their analyzed firms – U-Analytics – 
does not lose time in replying positively to the invitation of a third party to enter Australia, 
even though it knows little about this country. This results from the application of the 
representativeness heuristic, explicated as “restricting internationalization to English-speaking 
markets”, driven by the simplicity in entering contexts featuring a similar culture. Although in 
different contexts, Jones (2015) and Mugerman et al. (2016) similarly find that availability 
and representativeness interact, with the former affecting the latter. For example, Mugerman 
et al. (2016) discover that decision makers facing long-term investments are influenced first 
by the short-term interest rate changes available, that later can be representative of fixed or 
adjustable rate decisions.  
The heuristic view barely reported is obviously positive through attributing, according to 
these rules of thumb, the possibility to simplify human judgment under certain conditions; 
however, as written, heuristics can also present negative effects on decision making. In this 
regard, for example, Graffin et al. (2013) investigate what factors influence the evaluation of 
CEOs in the early stage of their appointment, through observing 432 CEO successions in 
Fortune 1000 firms. Evaluating new CEOs in their early stages is difficult, because, for 
example, of the influence of their past actions. Thus, this research shows that, in their 
evaluation process, boards use the representativeness heuristic in appointing new CEOs. In 
particular, Graffin et al. (2013) find that CEO candidates having experience in that position 
lead the governance to apply representativeness, through which potential directors are 
perceived as more successful than others that do not have this background; being seen as 
similar to the current CEO, in practice, gives more chances – at least 60% more – of not being 
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replaced in the first years of tenure.  
Finally, besides the interplay between availability and representativeness, there exists 
another pivotal interaction between the former and the affect heuristic. Indeed, as recently 
discovered by a series of experiments by Pachur et al. (2012), availability and affect can be 
comprised of a unique mechanism that combines both, either sequentially or in a composite 
manner. In particular, evidence shows that the accuracy of the decision maker’s perception of 
risk is driven by the calibration of the measure used, which may be simultaneously formed by 
the available direct experiences or by the affective dimensions of risk. These results also 
confirm the previous findings by Wåhlberg and Sjöberg (2000), who demonstrate the 
distortional effect of the information made available by media on risk perception, as well as 
the indirect influence of the available information on risk perception via affective states. 
 
5. Confirmation 
The confirmation heuristic appears when people use selective data for testing hypotheses, 
such as instances in which the variable of interest is present; decision makers, in practice, tend 
to selectively search for supportive information, discarding the opposite. The most relevant 
consequence of the confirmation heuristic is overconfidence, defined by Bazerman and Moore 
(2013) as the “mother of all biases”, because it has some of the most pervasive effects and 
facilitates many other biases. Overconfidence is the situation in which individuals tend to be 
overconfident about the infallibility of their judgments and it has been found in many settings. 
Confirmation and overconfidence are closely connected; in fact, people that become too 
sure about their own answers tend to overlook relevant information, alternatives and new 
evidence. For example, Shiller (2005) demonstrates that the stock markets were overvalued 
both in the case of the dot-com and real estate bubbles. These bubbles were led by the general 
enthusiasm towards these growing markets, mainly due to the overconfidence of decision 
 14 
 
makers in obtaining high returns, which increasingly pushed to retrieve and collect only 
confirming information. 
The mechanism above also seems to work when looking at the behaviour of entrepreneurs 
and MBA students when asked if they would compete in low or high competitive 
environments (Cain et al., 2015). Indeed, results show that both the groups tend to enter those 
competitions featuring easy tasks, because they believe themselves to be better than the 
others. These results are meaningful, especially if taking into account that the study’s 
participants expect that their supposed competitors make the same choice (i.e., entering the 
easy market); thus, even if they are aware that making the decision to enter an easy market 
would put them into a strong competition, they do not consider entering a more difficult 
market because they overestimate their scores. This result confirms the prior work by 
Gudmundsson and Lechner (2013), who find that overconfidence is the most detrimental bias 
for firms’ survival in the first years of their life cycles. 
Relatedly, Chen et al. (2015) investigate how overconfidence may occur when CEOs make 
corporate earnings forecasts. Testing the difference between at least two corporate earnings 
forecasts made by 217 CEOs in a 14-year time span (1994-2008), Chen and colleagues find 
substantial supportive results to their hypothesis that CEOs with greater overconfidence are 
resistant to strong corrective feedback. However, as Park et al. (2011) explain, CEO 
overconfidence may be pivotally determined by high levels of ingratiation, in terms of 
flattery and opinion conformity from other executives. In particular, these scholars investigate 
this phenomenon through surveys about opinion conformity from 451 CEOs of US firms and 
3,135 other executives identified as potential ingratiators. Their results totally support the 
initial hypotheses that CEOs with high social status are positively associated with CEO 
overconfidence and opinion conformity from other executives; this interplay brings to a low 
perception the need to change strategy in response to poor performance.  
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Strictly associated with overconfidence is also unrealistic optimism bias, defined as the 
tendency to overestimate the rosiness of our future, and also deriving from the confirmation 
heuristic. This bias has been observed in several domains and for the majority of people. 
Indeed, according to Sharot, “studies consistently report that a large majority of the 
population (about 80% according to most estimates) display an optimism bias” (2011, p. 
R942). Moreover, this bias seems to work not only before the decision making, but also in 
post-decisional moments. In fact, Meyer (2014) finds that decision makers involved in 
evaluating the business benefits to be delivered by their projects, usually forecast that related 
results will be higher than those previously planned; this brings to team members an 
escalation of commitment to failing projects. Similarly, from a survey administered to more 
than 800 CEOs, Langabeer and DelliFraine (2011) find that optimistic directors usually tend 
to use an incremental strategic process based on heuristics (such as availability and 
representativeness), as opposed to a comprehensive, rational process based on analysis. In 
practice, executives with high levels of optimism tend to rely on heuristics rather than rational 
processes for strategic decision making. Yet, Pandher and Currie (2013) find that optimism is 
usually connected with the risk aversion phenomenon; indeed, from their study, CEOs who 
underestimate risks emerging from competitiveness and are too confident about firm 
performance will experience higher compensation in equity rather than in variable cash pay.  
Finally, anchoring can be another possible negative driver of the confirmation heuristic. 
On this side, through the examination of focal premiums in 13,442 deals from 1986-2011, 
Malhotra et al. (2015) show that managers, consciously or unconsciously, rely on previous 
acquisition premiums paid in similar and time-close operations in their market, thus referring 
to the availability and representativeness heuristics. In this case, it seems that managers 
voluntarily search for a precedent and similar M&A operations to rely on for concluding their 
own operation, with the implicit drawback of not looking at the potential of the specific 
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operation. However, also for this trap there exists a direct link with the risk aversion heuristic, 
as demonstrated by Workman (2012). In particular, stemming from the fact that the outcome 
of the anchoring mechanism is usually the overestimation of probabilities (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981), leading to the overconfidence bias, Workman’s quasi-experimental study 
demonstrates that executives who generally have low risk aversion tend to both anchor their 
decisions on prior confirmatory data and continue a strategic initiative; moreover, results 
highlight that this process is amplified if these initiatives are positively framed. 
 
6. Risk aversion 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), disruptively challenges the expected utility 
axioms of decisions under risk, affirming that people who must make a decision among risky 
options primarily assess the potential value of the alternatives’ losses and gains, rather than 
the final outcome, through the use of heuristics. One of these shortcuts is risk aversion. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky, risk averse people tend to search for options with 
moderate probabilities of gains and small probabilities of losses; while, risk-seeking decision 
makers look for options featuring moderate chances of losses or small chances of gains. 
Moreover, decision makers’ preferences are driven by the formulation of the decision 
problem. In particular, people choose different options (generating inconsistencies) according 
to the positive or negative way in which the problem is posed, mainly because the different 
framing produces different perceptions of risks that, as a consequence, influence the decision 
makers’ affective states and their search strategies. 
Because of the relevance of these effects, over time scholars have looked at the risk 
aversion and associated framing trap in the strategic decision making context. For example, in 
the study by Hodgkinson et al. (1999), students and senior bank managers presented with 
tasks posed both in a positively and negatively framed version tend to choose the risk-seeking 
 17 
 
situation when facing a negative framed version of the problem. This demonstrates the link 
between the framing trap and the risk aversion variable.  
The dangerousness of this trap is determined by the fact that the different frame of a 
problem situation can emerge from a number of factors; for example, also looking at other 
people’s results. Indeed, according to Fox and Dayan (2004), people are influenced by their 
own achievements in stock investments and by those of their peers relative to their own; in 
practice, others’ results work as a frame for identifying the goodness of performance. In 
particular, people perceive a gain only when others perform equally to them; if others gain 
more than them, the result is perceived as a loss, even if it is not. 
Moreover, variables that affect risk perception may be other biases themselves. Indeed, as 
proved by Simon et al. (2000), individuals aiming at starting new ventures do not perceive the 
risks involved, mainly through being affected by the law of small numbers and 
overconfidence in their abilities. Decision makers, in practice, perceive less risk because they 
use a small sample of information to draw firm conclusions; furthermore, they do not 
recognize that some important firms’ tasks are beyond their control. This evidence is also 
confirmed by Peon et al. (2016), who find that the investment risk behaviour of people is 
mainly driven by the combined effect of high levels of overconfidence and risk-seeking. 
All this stated, another advancement made in prospect theory is the recognition of the left-
digit effect as a frame that can influence risk behaviour. Indeed, the analysis by Fraser-
Mackenzie et al. (2015), about buy-sell imbalances in over 15 million trades by investors in a 
financial market, demonstrates that decisions regarding losses are more affected by this 
particular frame than decisions regarding gains – pushing, de facto, to a change in risk 
behaviour. Furthermore, time pressure can also be another framing variable for risky 
decisions; indeed, for prospects that concern both losses and gains, decision makers are 
contemporarily loss averse and gain seeking under time pressure, thus depending on the 
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framing of the prospects (Kocher et al., 2013).  
Nonetheless, when the analysis of the framing trap shifts from individuals to groups, there 
are more chances to overcome it. In particular, as recently shown by Curseu et al. (2016), 
groups of professionals who operate according to collaborative decision rules rarely tend to 
change their preferences under the gain-loss frames and, as a result, are more aligned with 
rational axioms. However, if the opinions of the group members do not differ, they can fall 
into groupthink behaviour, thus the tendency to minimize conflicts, such as to reach a 
consensus decision, that in turn leads to the self-reinforcing of their points of view.  
From this last point, it seems clear that an interaction should exist between the framing trap 
and the risk of being anchored to the information provided (Wu and Cheng, 2011), which, as 
a consequence, may increase the overconfidence of the decision maker. In this regard, 
scholars have deepened the relationship between framing and overconfidence (e.g., Landie et 
al., 2016), reaching the shared conclusion that the negative framing of a strategic problem has 
a positive impact on decision making processes, because overconfident decision makers are 
pushed to more appropriate group processes and analysis; conversely, in the presence of a 
positive frame, overconfident people tend to reduce their efforts in decision making. 
 
7. Discussion 
Our study has been aimed at addressing the classical, but still lively, questions of why and 
how cognitive distortions in managerial decision making occur. In this regard, we have started 
from Simon’s bounded rationality (1947) and its associated assumptions about the cognitive 
aspects of the decision makers’ mistakes. Over time, scholars have also contributed to 
bounded rationality with studies of a psychological nature, because “judgement refers to the 
cognitive aspects of the decision making process” (Bazerman and Moore, 2013, p. 1). In this 
vein, stemming from the fact that the individual’s representation of objects, goals, and 
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actions, in a problem situation (i.e., the problem space [Newell and Simon, 1972]) has, at its 
basis, the cognitive representation of the overall problem (Greeno and Simon, 1984), the 
distortions – heuristics and biases – that may occur in problem solving are certainly related to 
the cognitive functioning of the involved decision makers. 
On the basis of this theoretical premise, we have thus contemporaneously adopted the 
frameworks developed by Kahneman et al. (2011), and Bazerman and Moore (2013), to 
critically review the representative literature most recently published about cognitive 
distortions in managerial decision making. As exposed in the review – and further discussed 
in this section – insights from our analysis can have a two-fold value: on the one hand, they 
can support the de-biasing activity of practitioners, allowing them to recognize the inner 
distortions potentially occurring while making management decisions; on the other hand, they 
can support scholars with more fine-grained lenses when studying cognitive distortions, 
through exploiting the most vividly intertwined relationships between biases and their 
emanating heuristics.  
This introduced, among the different evidence emerging from the contents of our work, 
what seems to merit additional attention here, especially for its theoretical and prescriptive 
implications for the management development, is that the most recent advancements in the 
management literature are focusing on the interactions among heuristics and on their joint 
effect on decision making processes. In fact, connections seem to exist among all the four 
emanating heuristics; some heuristics have a univocal direction, while others reciprocally 
affect each other. We label this intertwined influencing network of heuristics as the heuristic 
co-evolving diamond (Figure 1). 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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As Figure 1 shows, considering that, on the basis of the reviewed literature, all the 
discussed main distortions can be equally conceived as internally generated by the 
interactions among the four emanating heuristics, a pivotal role in the diamond seems to be 
played by affect. On the one hand, affect influences the weight of positive and negative 
outputs within risky decisions; while, on the other hand, its distortional power depends on the 
framing of options and on the available information at the time of the decision making 
process (e.g., Schlösser et al., 2013; Townsend et al., 2014). Depending on the positive or 
negative affective state felt by the decision maker, the affective states resulting from this 
twofold process may lead to different search strategies and effort in collecting new 
information (e.g., Welpe et al., 2012; Bachkirov, 2015). On this basis, the decision maker 
may fall into a self-reinforcing process (e.g., Abatecola, 2014), in which her/his confidence 
about the choice’s information drastically increases or decreases. In particular, the perceived 
risk of alternatives can lead to the confirmation bias and vice versa, such as in the case of the 
anchoring mechanism coming out from the framing of options (e.g., Workman, 2012) and 
from the decision makers’ optimism, which can push towards a low perception of risk (e.g., 
Pandher and Currie, 2013). The consequence of decision makers’ overconfidence is to rely 
more on their own cognitive abilities, thus on mental schemas and related shortcuts (e.g., 
Langabeer and DelliFraine, 2011). As a result, the conscious or unconscious implementation 
of biases generally brings confirming evidence, which affects the vicious (or virtuous) loop 
(e.g., Malhotra et al., 2015). 
From what we have argued above, the emanating heuristics and their associated biases 
interact in a way that can reinforce or reduce the overall biasing effect; distortions, in practice, 
co-evolve (e.g., Breslin, 2011; Abatecola, 2012). In other words, the self-reinforcing dynamic 
can be recognized not only in the heuristics-heuristics, but also in the heuristics-biases 
relationship. In the former, for example, we could consider affect and risk aversion: in this 
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regard, decision makers usually choose the most touching alternative according to the degree 
of risk perceived during the decision making process and, vice versa, affective states are 
influenced (e.g., Schlösser et al., 2013; Townsend et al., 2014). In the latter, instead, we could 
consider confirmation and anchoring: on this side, decision makers who tend to find 
confirming data are also inclined to anchor their opinions to their own available knowledge 
base, which, in turn, reinforces their search strategy based on looking at corroborating 
evidence (e.g., Workman, 2012; Malhotra et al., 2015). In practice, the 
availability/representativeness heuristic is determined, in some terms, by the confirmation 
heuristic (and vice versa). 
 
7.1. Implications and conclusions 
We believe that deepening the study of the co-evolving relationships between heuristics and 
biases discussed in our work can have important prescriptive implications in terms of 
management development and de-biasing techniques, because it can help shed light on the 
overall effect of cognitive distortions in managerial decision making – an effect which, from 
some aspects, still seems to be under-investigated. For example, although availability and 
representativeness have been generally recognized as working together in biasing decision 
makers’ judgment, only in recent times has their distortional combination with affect, in 
assessing risk perception, been acknowledged. Indeed, the assessment of risk in a time-
pressure situation is based on the contemporarily or subsequent activation of the decision 
makers’ mind attempting to recall past experience in which a similar event happened, as well 
as eliciting some feelings that are directly connected to the object of evaluation. Thus, it 
clearly emerges that heuristics are strategies derived from previous experiences dealing with 
similar problems and they are prevalently used when the individual experiences have a high 
cognitive load; heuristics, in practice, work by recalling vivid information from the prior 
 22 
 
experience of the decision maker, but, unfortunately, they can affect the subsequent decision 
making activities, even if they are only partially connected with those activities elicited by 
memory. 
In conclusion, to show how the framework emerging from our review can support the de-
biasing activity, an example from the practice of business can be useful: a manager 
understanding that, because of the empathy they share, she/he has fallen in the affect 
emanating heuristic when favorably assessing a subordinate’s job, should question 
herself/himself about the subsequent potential cognitive distortions she/he has fallen into 
because of the former; cognitive distortions such as that of being superficial in evaluating and, 
potentially, even promoting the subordinate. Thus, being aware of this intertwined 
relationship among emanating heuristics and biases can help decision makers in controlling 
their decision making processes: such as, for example, asking an equivalent manager or the 
HR specialist to make a personal evaluation of the subordinate, in order to reframe her/his real 
value in the job. 
“Firms are contrived systems. They are made of men and are imperfect systems” (Katz and 
Khan, 1966, p. 33). If we take into account this seminal, but everlasting, assumption on how 
businesses are run (Cafferata, 2016), understanding why and how cognitive distortions can 
happen in managerial decision making (and how they can be de-biased) continues to merit 
pivotal attention to support future management development.   
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Table 1. The review framework: From cognitive traps to emanating heuristics 
Questions Associated Trap(s) Emanating 
Heuristic(s) 
Recent Representative Evidence (*) 
1) Is there any reason to suspect the team making the 
recommendation of errors motivated by self-interest? Self-serving 
Affect 
Coget et al. (2011); Blay et al. (2012); 
Welpe et al. (2012); Pachur and Galesic 
(2013); Schlösser et al. (2013); 
Townsend et al. (2014); Bachkirov 
(2015); Sokolowska and Sledoba 
(2015); Davis et al. (2017) 
2) Has the team fallen in love with its proposal? Emotion and cognition collision 
3) Were there dissenting opinions within the team? Were they 
explored adequately? 
Emotion and cognition 
collision 
4) Could the diagnosis be overly influenced by an analogy to a 
memorable success? Ease of recall/Retrievability 
Availability/ 
Representativeness 
Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011); 
Mitchell and Shepherd (2011); Pachur et 
al. (2012); Graffin et al. (2013); 
Pentland (2013); Bachkirov (2015); 
Jones (2015); Mugerman et al. (2016) 
5) Are credible alternatives included along with the 
recommendation? Ease of recall/Retrievability 
6) If you had to make this decision again in a year’s time, what 
information would you want? And can you get more of it now? Ease of recall/Retrievability 
7) Do you know where the numbers came from? Anchoring 
Confirmation 
Langabeer and DelliFraine (2011); Park 
et al. (2011); Sharot (2011); Workman 
(2012); Gudmundsson and Lechner 
(2013); Pandher and Currie (2013); 
Caputo (2014); Meyer (2014); Cain et 
al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Malhotra 
et al. (2015); Clark et al. (2016) 
8) Is the team assuming that a person, organization, or approach 
that is successful in one area will be as successful in another? 
Hindsight and the curse of 
knowledge 
9) Are the recommenders overly attached to a history of past 
decisions? 
Hindsight and the curse of 
knowledge 
10) Is the best case overly optimistic? Overconfidence/Optimism 
11) Is the worst case bad enough? Overconfidence/Optimism 
12) Is the recommending team overly cautious? Framing Risk Aversion 
Wu and Cheng (2011); Blay et al. 
(2012); Kocher et al. (2013); Fraser-
Mackenzie et al. (2015); Curseu et al. 
(2016); Landie et al. (2016); Peon et al. 
(2016) 
Source: elaboration on Kahneman et al. (2011) and Bazerman and Moore (2013). 
*: in increasing chronological order. 
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Figure 1. The heuristic co-evolving diamond 
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